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Monetary Policy in Europe versus 
the United States
What Explains the Diﬀerence?
Harald Uhlig
9.1    Introduction
Interest rate paths during the last decade or so have been remarkably 
diﬀerent in the United States and in Europe (see ﬁ  gure 9.1). What explains 
the diﬀerence?
The analysis of this chapter leads to the conclusion that the diﬀerence is 
due to surprises in productivity as well as surprises in wage demands—mov-
ing interest rates in opposite directions in Europe and the United States—
but not due to a more sluggish response in Europe to the same shocks or 
to diﬀerent monetary policy surprises. To obtain these conclusions, I have 
speciﬁ  ed and estimated a hybrid new- Keynesian dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model and have used it to investigate three potential 
interpretations for the U.S.-  European monetary union (EMU) diﬀerence.
The ﬁ  rst interpretation is to argue that monetary policy is simply diﬀerent. 
A number of observers have argued that the diﬀerence in policy shows the 
diﬀerence between an established central bank in the United States (which 
knows what it is doing and acts decisively, if need be), versus a new central 
bank in Europe, run by a committee that is too timid and too inertial to any-
thing in time, following the U.S. example with too much caution and delay. A 
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more benign interpretation—recently put forth by European Central Bank 
(ECB) president Trichet in a speech, “Activism and alertness in monetary 
policy,” in Madrid 2006—argues that instead it is the ECB holding the steer-
ing wheel steady, while the monetary policy pursued by the Fed is just erratic.
The second interpretation is that the shocks simply have been diﬀerent. 
For example, growth in the United States was considerably higher in the 
second half of the 1990s, giving rise to fear of “overheating” there and 
thereby possibly necessitating policy interventions, which then needed 
to be reversed, as the U.S. economy spun into a recession. While the 
decline in growth rates in EMU may have been similarly large between 
2000 and 2002, the growth rate only brieﬂ  y achieved U.S. levels in 2000 
(see ﬁ  gure 9.2).
The third interpretation is that the structure of the economies are simply 
diﬀerent. There are three striking diﬀerences in particular:
1. Labor markets are more rigid in Europe than in the United States. 
While one can point to some measures, the evidence here comes more from a 
variety of sources and qualitative measures, starting with labor market regu-
lations and government interference in the labor market to union member-
ships and the role of unions in economic policy and the governance of ﬁ  rms.
2.  The share of government is larger in Europe than it is in the United 
States. For the period from 1985 to 2005, mean government consumption to 
gross domestic product (GDP) was 16 percent in the United States and 20 
percent in Europe. For government expenditure, the contrast was even more 
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striking, with 32 percent in the United States versus 50 percent in Europe (see 
also ﬁ  gure 9.3). Furthermore, ﬁ  scal policy is arguably more decentralized 
in Europe, with Brussels playing a minor role vis-  à-  vis the nation states in 
Europe compared to the federal government vis- à- vis state and local govern-
ments in the United States.
3.  A much larger share of business is bank-  ﬁ  nanced rather than market- 
ﬁ  nanced in EMU, compared to the United States. For example, de Fiore 
and Uhlig (2006) document that the ratio of debt-  to-  equity is .41 in the 
United States and .61 in Europe. Furthermore, the ratio of bank-  to-  bond 
Fig. 9.2    Real GDP growth in the United States and EMU
Fig. 9.3    Government consumption and government expenditure492    Harald Uhlig
ﬁ  nance is 7.3 in the EMU and thus ten times as high as 0.74, the value for 
the United States.
It seems a priori plausible that these diﬀerences play a signiﬁ  cant factor 
in the explanations for monetary policy. For example, government spending 
tends to be rather smooth and acyclical: a larger share of government spend-
ing might therefore lessen the role of price rigidities for the private economy.
Recent advances in the modeling of dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium models—for example, Smets and Wouters (2003), Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans (2005) and related work—in particular have made it pos-
sible in principle to impose the key structural diﬀerences of the economy, 
estimate monetary policy reaction functions, and quantitatively account 
for the movements in key variables by a decomposition into the model- 
speciﬁ  c structural shocks. This avenue is therefore well- suited for answering 
the question at hand.
These models are built on recent advances in investigating the role of 
sticky prices for the economy and the new- Keynesian paradigm (see, in par-
ticular, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler [1999] and Woodford [2003]). Applying 
them directly to the task at hand poses three challenges, however.
1.  Most of these models emphasize the role of sticky prices and the out-
put gap in driving inﬂ  ation rates. Frictions from the interaction between 
ﬁ  nancial intermediation and monetary policy typically play no role or a role 
only insofar as they inﬂ  uence the output gap. This makes it challenging to 
address the third of the three key diﬀerences mentioned previously.
2.  The distortionary role of nonmonetary economic policy typically plays 
a minor role. This makes it hard to address the ﬁ  rst and the second of the 
aforementioned key diﬀerences.
3. In quantitative applications and estimations, many observable time 
series are used. An equivalent number of shocks is then used in order to 
generate a regular one- step ahead variance- covariance matrix of the predic-
tion errors. This makes it challenging to avoid pushing key dynamic features 
of the economy into “measurement errors” instead, which then receive a 
structural interpretation.
There is an earlier literature, emphasizing ﬁ  nancial frictions and the 
reallocational role of monetary injections. For example, Lucas and Stokey 
(1987) emphasize the role of cash for some of the transactions, while Ber-
nanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) emphasize credit contracts arising in the 
presence of asymmetric information. While the new-  Keynesian approach 
in focusing on sticky prices may be appealing for a number of reasons, it is 
useful for the task at hand to bring lessons of that earlier literature into this 
framework.
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this task. In their seminal paper, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) 
(henceforth, CEE) impose a cash-  in-  advance constraint for ﬁ  rms to pay 
their wage bill. Firms borrow these funds from ﬁ  nancial intermediaries who 
in turn obtain funds from household deposits as well as central bank cash 
injection. While this feature of their paper seems there mostly to create some 
sort of money demand, it opens the possibility of studying ﬁ  nancial frictions 
further. Schmitt-  Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Altig et al. (2004) assume an 
additional cost for purchasing consumption goods, which depends on the 
velocity of the household’s cash balances. Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno 
(2003) introduce a fairly rich banking sector, allowing for various monetary 
aggregates such as bank reserves and demand deposits, to study the role of 
money in the Great Depression.
To keep the model tractable, yet allow for some potentially important 
avenues, I largely follow the lead of CEE. I additionally allow for a cash-  in- 
advance constraint on consumption good purchases in order to judge the 
relative importance of private transactions to ﬁ  rm borrowing. I allow for the 
possibility that not all cash injections are permanent, but instead are taken 
out of the system again at the end of the period (which one might think of 
as a one-  oﬀ reverse transaction). Finally, I explicitly account for the cost of 
borrowing in the proﬁ  t maximization problem and price setting problem 
of the ﬁ  rm, giving rise to an interest rate cost channel (see also Barth and 
Ramey [2001] and Secchi and Gaiotti [2006]). This is a modest contribution 
to solving the ﬁ  rst of the three challenges listed previously.
I will explicitly allow for distortionary taxation of labor income, used to 
ﬁ  nance a stock of government as well as a certain level of government expen-
diture. I view this as a beginning to make progress on the second challenge. 
Certainly, several—although not all—monetary policy models of recent 
vintage have allowed for such inﬂ  uence of nonmonetary policy: this model 
is in the same tradition. In particular, Schmitt-  Grohe and Uribe (2006) add 
distortionary income taxation to CEE.
For the third challenge, I use Dynare and thus oﬀ- the- shelves  estimation 
techniques, and discuss some issues arising from mapping the dynamics 
into the dynamics for few observable series only, employing the “ABCD” 
framework of Fernandez-  Villaverde, Rubio-  Ramirez, and Sargent (2007). 
In particular, I will focus on a small set of observable variables, judiciously 
chosen, and allow for as many shocks as there are variables. It will turn out 
that one needs to be careful. It is not just enough to insure an invertible map-
ping from the shocks to the innovations of the variables, but furthermore, it 
is important to check invertibility of the Value at Risk (VAR) representation 
itself. We do this by “visually” inspecting the VAR coeﬃcients in the derived 
representation (see section 9.4).
In sum, the model can perhaps best be described as a variant of the CEE 
model, with the following deviations:494    Harald Uhlig
1.  The costs of adjusting the capital stock arise from the investment-  to- 
capital ratio, not the investment-  to-  previous-  investment ratio.
2.  There is a cash- in- advance constraint for household consumption pur-
chases.
3.  Only a fraction of the cash injections, which “liquify” the loan market 
for ﬁ  rms, may permanently increase the money supply.
4.  The interest rate costs for borrowing part of the input bill explicitly 
arises in the objective function of the intermediate good ﬁ  rms.
5.  Capital utilization is constant.
6.  There is a distortionary tax on wage income and ﬁ  rm proﬁ  ts. There is 
government debt.
7.  There is no indexation.
8.  There is real wage sluggishness, following Blanchard and Galí (2005).
9.  Monetary policy is assumed to follow a Taylor rule.
10. There are six shocks: a productivity shock, an investment-  speciﬁ  c 
shock, a wage setting shock, a monetary policy shock and two ﬁ  scal policy 
shocks, a tax rate shock, and a spending shock. For estimation, I only “turn 
on” the tax rate shock.
11.  Estimation is in terms of ﬁ  ve variables, inverting for the shocks per 
the recursive law of motion.
The approach of this chapter (as well as the results) share many simi-
larities with the two slightly earlier papers by Sahuc and Smets (2008) and 
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2007).
Sahuc and Smets (2008, 507) likewise come to the “overall conclusion [. . .] 
that diﬀerences in the size and the persistence of the shocks hitting the two 
economies is the main driving force behind the diﬀerent interest rate behav-
iour.” Their model diﬀers from mine in several dimensions. Most notably, 
perhaps, there is no role for ﬁ  scal policy and hardly a role for diﬀerences in 
the ﬁ  nancial structure in their paper.
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2007) also share the view with this 
chapter that “the U.S. economy was aided during the most severe phase of 
the [2001] recession by favourable productivity shocks, which [ . . . ] helped 
keep inﬂ  ation in check. By contrast, the slowdown in the Euro Area was 
exacerbated by negative productivity forces which also prevented inﬂ  ation 
from ebbing” (5). These authors furthermore emphasize the greater persis-
tence of ECB policy compared to Fed policy. This is in some contrast to our 
ﬁ  ndings: while, for example, monetary policy shocks are more persistent in 
the EMU than the United States according to our ﬁ  ndings, interest rates 
are not.
The model by Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2007) features a much 
more detailed entrepreneurial sector as well as more details on the banking 
sector, and therefore makes more progress than this chapter in its ability to 
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Europe. There is no role for ﬁ  scal policy in their paper, though. Their model 
is driven by ﬁ  fteen shocks, whereas my model features only ﬁ  ve. The costs 
of adjusting capital in their model are determined by the change in invest-
ment, whereas it is determined (more classically) by the ratio of investment 
to capital here.
These two papers therefore complement the investigation here. Despite 
a number of modeling diﬀerences they come to fairly similar conclusions, 
which ought to provide additional trust in the conclusions drawn.
Section 9.2 explains the model. A technical appendix provides the details 
for the analysis of the model. Section 9.3 explains the estimation strategy 
and lists the parameters used for the comparison. Section 9.4 is devoted to 
the invertibility issue. Section 9.5 provides results. Section 9.6 discusses these 
results and oﬀers some tentative conclusions.
9.2    The  Model
The model is a combination of a cash-  in-  advance model and a Calvo 
sticky-  price model, amended with a role for a government.
Time is discrete. There are identical households, who supply labor and 
enjoy ﬁ  nal consumption. They own all ﬁ  rms. They use cash for parts of their 
transactions. There is a competitive sector of ﬁ  nal goods producing ﬁ  rms. 
There is a unit interval of monopolistic intermediate good ﬁ  rms, using labor 
to produce output and setting sticky prices. They need to borrow a fraction 
of their input bill from commercial banks. Commercial banks take deposits 
from households and receive cash injections from the central bank. They 
lend to intermediate goods ﬁ  rms. The central bank injects cash and thereby 
sets the nominal interest rate. The government taxes wage income and uses 
it to ﬁ  nance government purchases as well as debt repayments. Nominal 
wages are sluggish on the aggregate level.
A period has four parts:
1.  Shocks are realized. The new nominal wage for the period is set. The 
central bank injects cash  t to banks.
2.  A fraction of intermediate good ﬁ  rms is chosen to reset its price. Inter-
mediate good ﬁ  rms “guess” demand and produce accordingly, hiring labor 
at the market wage. They are assumed to be required to borrow a ﬁ  xed frac-
tion of the input bill from banks.
3.  Households shop, using cash at hand as well. Government shops, using 
tax receipts as well as a short-  term credit line from the central bank.
4.  Financial markets open. Firms pay capital rental payments and wages 
to households. Firms pay interest to banks. They pay proﬁ  ts to households. 
Households pay taxes to the government. The government issues new bonds 
and repays old bonds. The household splits the remaining cash into deposits 
with banks and cash-  at-  hand for the next period.496    Harald Uhlig
9.2.1    Households
Households enjoy ﬁ  nal consumption ct and dislike labor nt according to
(1) U    E
 t=0
 
∑  t(log(ct    ct 1)   Ant
1  ),
where 0       1 is a habit  parameter and 1/     0 is the Frisch elasticity of 
labor supply. Households enter period t, holding deposits Dt– 1 at ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries and cash- at- hand Ht– 1. In the second part of the period, they 
supply labor nt according to demand at the market wage W t. In the third part, 
they use cash-  at-  hand to shop for a fraction   of consumption,
(2)  Ht,res    P tct   Ht 1,
holding residual cash Ht,res   0. I essentially assume that there are cash 
goods and credit goods as in Lucas and Stokey (1987), but that these cash 
and credit goods are purchased in ﬁ  xed proportion for consumption, and 
that investment goods are always credit goods.1 The latter would be implied 
by a Leontieﬀ speciﬁ  cation for the preferences in cash and credit goods. In 
principle, the household may spend less cash than available. However, I shall 
assume that shocks and parameters are such that the constraint on residual 
cash is binding, Ht,res   0.
In the fourth part of the period, households receive after-  tax nominal 
wages and trade all contingent claims, as well as ﬁ  rm shares and government 
bonds, and pay for the remaining (1 –    ) share of their purchases (“credit 
goods”). Netting out all household-  to-  household trades, the ﬁ  nancial mar-
ket budget constraint is
(3)  Ht   Dt   qtBt   (1    )P tct   P txt   
(1    t)W tnt   (1   it)Dt 1   P trtKt 1   (1    V)V t   Bt 1   Ht,res,
where Ht is cash-  at-  hand for the next period, Dt is deposited with banks, qt 
is the discount price for government bonds Bt, 1   it is the return paid by 
banks on deposits Dt– 1, P trt is the nominal rental rate for capital, V t is the 
value added of intermediate good ﬁ  rms, and Bt– 1 are the debt repayments 
by the government.
One can extend this budget constraint with between- household trades. In 
particular, let Λt,t k be the discount price on the ﬁ  nancial market at t for an 
extra unit of cash on the ﬁ  nancial market at date t   k.
Also, households produce new capital subject according to
(4)  kt   1       ϕ(1   ux,t)
xt  
kt 1kt 1,
1. A key reason for introducing the cash-  in-  advance constraint on only a fraction of the 
goods is that otherwise the money stock becomes quantitatively large in this model, implying 
that seignorage is a substantial fraction of the government budget constraint.Monetary Policy in Europe versus the United States    4 9 7
where the adjustment cost function ϕ( ) satisﬁ  es




for some ϖ   0 (see Jermann [1998]), and where ux,t is a possibly persistent 
investment- speciﬁ  c disturbance,
(5)  ux,t    xux,t 1   εx,t,
following Fisher (2006).
9.2.2    Final  Good  Firms
Final good ﬁ  rms take inputs yt,j to produce a ﬁ  nal good yt according to 
the production function




1/ (1  )dj
1  
.
They purchase intermediate goods at price P t,i per unit and sell the ﬁ  nal 
good at price P t.
9.2.3    Intermediate  Good  Firms
Given a current intermediate goods price P t,j, intermediate good ﬁ  rms 
“guess” their demand yt,j resulting from the demand of ﬁ  nal good ﬁ  rms, see 
equation (62). They thus hire labor nt,j at nominal wages W t and rent capital 
kt,j at nominal rental rates P trt to produce output according to
(7) 
yt,j   
 tk 
t,jnt,j
1       if   tnt,j    
 0  otherwise,
where  t is an exogenous process for the change in technology and   is a 
parameter of the production function and might be thought of as a ﬁ  xed 
cost of production. Let   ˆt   log( t) –   log(  ) for some appropriate   , and 
assume
(8)    ˆt     ,L  ˆt 1   u ,t
 u  ,t     ,uu ,t 1   ε ,t.
I assume that the ﬁ  rm needs to obtain a loan Lt,j for a fraction ξt of the 
input bill, on which a nominal market interest rate it needs to be paid. The 
rest of the input bill is paid for per trade credit (or more eﬃcient market 
instruments) to be settled at the end of the period, on which no interest needs 
to be paid. That is, let MCt be the nominal marginal costs of producing an 
extra unit of output, excluding the additional costs of borrowing (see equa-
tion [54]). Then,
Lt,j   ξMCtyt,j498    Harald Uhlig
and the value added of this ﬁ  rm (or, equivalently, end- of- period proﬁ  ts) are
(9)  V t,j   (P t,j   (1   ξit)MCt)yt,j.
Firms get to reoptimize prices with probability 1 –    , independently of 
their past. If they cannot reoptimize prices, they will be adjusted at the aver-
age inﬂ  ation rate; that is,
(10)  P t,j     P t 1,j.
When given a chance to reoptimize prices, they will choose it so as to maxi-
mize discounted value added along the no-  optimization-  of-  prices path2
(11) NPV t,j   E
 k=0
 
∑  kΛt,t kV t,j,
where Λt,t k is the market price at date t for an extra unit of cash at date t   
k on the ﬁ  nancial markets in part four of the period.
9.2.4    Commercial  Banks
Banks compete for deposits from households and can borrow from the 
central bank. They then compete for giving loans to ﬁ  rms. Banks collect the 
returns on their loans in the fourth part of the period, and then repay house-
holds as well as the central bank. In equilibrium, banks make zero proﬁ  ts. 
Thus, there will be a market nominal rate of return it on loans, deposits, and 
central bank money.
9.2.5    The  Central  Bank
The central bank provides cash  t into the economy via providing loans to 
the commercial banks at the nominal interest rate it. It may be best to think 
of this as open market operations. The interest earnings on this open market 
operation constitute seignorage. Additionally, the central bank declares a 
fraction   of the cash injection to be seignorage, not to be taken out of the 
system after repayment by the commercial banks. Thus, the government 
receives a central bank proﬁ  t transfer of (    it) t in part four of the period.
Note that only    t, but not the interest earnings on the cash injection (or 
even the entire cash injection) constitute an increase in the money supply,
(12)  Mt   Mt 1      t.
The parameter   allows the distinction between a short-  run liquidity injec-
tion and a long- run increase in money supply. If     0, liquidity is provided 
only temporarily, and taken out of the economy after the injection. Seignor-
age is then given only by the interest earned on the short-  term injection. By 
2. Note that I assume that value added or proﬁ  ts are taxed at rate  V. Because I hold this 
rate constant, maximizing the net present value of before-  tax value added is equivalent to 
maximizing the net present value of after- tax value added, which would be the more appropri-
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contrast,     1 means that any short-  term injection also increases money 
supply in the long run.
Recall that the output gap is deﬁ  ned as the diﬀerence between actual 
output and the output that would emerge in the absence of sticky prices 
and absence of stickiness in wages; that is, for     0 and     1, but keeping 
the friction of borrowing from banks. In an economy without sticky prices 
and sticky wages and without the need to borrow from banks, real marginal 
costs will be constant. The percent deviation of actual real marginal costs
(13) mct   
MCt  
P t
from its steady-  state level can therefore serve as a proxy for the output gap.
I therefore assume that the central bank follows a Taylor rule in setting 
interest rates, using this ratio that
(14) i t   i     i,Lit 1   (1    i,L)ζ 
 t  
  
   1   ζx
mct  
m c 
   1   ui,t,
where
(15)   t   
P t  
P t 1
is inﬂ  ation, where   is the inﬂ  ation target, i  is the steady-  state nominal rate, 
ζ  and ζx are coeﬃcients of the policy rule, and where
(16)  ui,t    i,uui,t 1   εi,t
is a possibly persistent distortion to the Taylor rule, driven by the monetary 
policy shock εi,t.
9.2.6    The  Government
The budget constraint of the government at the end of the period is given 
by
(17)  qtBt   Bt 1   P tgt    tW tnt    VV t   (    it) t.
The government does not carry cash from one period to the next. However, 
the government is assumed to ﬁ  nance its purchases within the period via a 
short-  term credit from the central bank. Thus, government spending P tgt is 
akin to a short-  term cash injection on the demand side. This is consistent 
with the view that the central bank acts as the “checking account” bank to 
the government. Note that I do not allow the government to borrow from 
the central bank in the long term.
Deﬁ  ne real debt
(18)  bt   
Bt  
P t
,500    Harald Uhlig
real seignorage
(19)   t   




(20)  vt   
V t  
P t
,
as well as real wages
(21)  wt   
W t  
P t
.
I assume that the government aims at some steady-  state debt-  to-  GDP 
ratio b /  y , as well as some steady-  state level government-  spending-  to-  GDP 
ratio g /  y . Given all other parameters, let    be the steady-  state tax rate on 
wage income consistent with these targets.
I assume that the government follows the policy rule of adjusting future 
tax and spending plans, if the current debt level bt deviates from its target 
level b ,
(22)   t        ζ 
bt 1   b 
 
y 




   ζg
bt 1   b 
 
y 
   1   ug,t,
where ζ    0 and ζg   0 such that the dynamics of government debt remains 
stable, and where both equations are driven by possibly persistent distortions
(24)  u ,t     u ,t 1   ε ,t
(25)  ug,t    gug,t 1   εg,t,
driven by the ﬁ  scal tax shock ε ,t and the ﬁ  scal spending shock εg,t.
9.2.7      Labor Markets and Wage Setting
I assume that wages move sluggishly on the aggregate level. A common 
form to generate nominal wage sluggishness is to assume Calvo wage sticki-
ness for wage setters (see Erceg, Henderson, and Levin [2000]). A diﬀerent 
literature has emphasized frictions or sluggishness stemming from bar-
gaining as the route cause (see Shimer [2005] or Hall [2005]), giving direct 
rise to real wage sluggishness. The form I use here has been adapted from 
Blanchard and Galí (2005) and has been used, for example, in Uhlig (2007).
More speciﬁ  cally, let W t,f be the wage emerging from the ﬁ  rst-  order condi-
tion of the households’ maximization problem. I assume that
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for some Υ   1 and a possibly persistent stochastic distortion
(27)  uw,t    wuw,t 1   εw,t.
An alternative interpretation of the distortion uw,t is to view it as being driven 
by ﬂ  uctuations in the preference parameter A, manifested in stochastic ﬂ  uc-
tuations of the market- clearing wage W t,f. This perspective may be a reason-
able shortcut in order to account for the ﬂ  uctuations in female labor supply, 
for example.
Assuming moderate-  size ﬂ  uctuations, actual wages will exceed the wage 
stemming from the ﬁ  rst-  order condition, W t   W t,f, and thus, labor mar-
kets will be demand constrained. That is, I assume that households always 
supply labor at the going wage. Note that (26) can be rewritten in terms of 
real wages as
(28)  wt   ((1    )wt 1    ϒwt,f)(1   uw,t),
where wt,f   W t,f/  P t.
9.2.8      Aggregation and Market Clearing
1. Money market: Post-  injection money supply equals end-  of-  period 
money demand. This is given by
(29)  Mt   Dt   Ht.
2. Final  goods  market:
(30)  gt   ct   xt   yt.
3. Labor  market:




4. Capital  market:




5. Loan  market:




9.2.9    Equilibrium  and  Solution
An equilibrium is an allocation, policy parameters and prices (including 
returns and proﬁ  ts) such that
1. The allocation solves the problem of the representative household, 
given prices and policy parameters.502    Harald Uhlig
2. The allocation solves the ﬁ  rms maximization problems, given prices 
and policy parameters.
3.  The constraints for the government and the central bank hold.
4. Markets  clear.
To solve for the equilibrium, I characterize the ﬁ  rst-  order conditions, 
explicitly solve for the steady state, and characterize the dynamics per log- 
linearization around the steady state. I then compute the recursive law of 
motion solving these log- linearized equations. Details are available in a tech-
nical appendix.
9.3    Data  and  Estimation
I assume that ug,t 	 0; that is, I assume that there are no ﬁ  scal spending 
shocks. This is reasonable in light of the smoothness3 in ﬁ  gure 9.3.
There are ﬁ  ve shocks in the model: I therefore need observations on ﬁ  ve 
time series to solve for these shocks:
1. Inﬂ  ation,  t. I calculate it using the GDP deﬂ  ator, since I am using real 
GDP in some other measures. A popular alternative is to use the consumer 
price index (CPI).
2.  The central bank interest rate or short rate, it.
3. Labor  productivity,  yt/  nt. For yt, I use real GDP. For nt, I use employ-
ment rather than hours worked. In a boom, more part-  time labor will be 
hired, but also, more “uncounted” hours are worked by employees: thus, it 
may be that employment rather than hours is a more reasonable variable 
to measure ﬂ  uctuations in labor input. It was also the series that was more 
easily available.
4. The  consumption-  to- GDP  ratio,  ct/  yt. Cochrane (1994) in particular 
has shown that this ratio has predictive power for GDP growth and a num-
ber of other variables. Theory implies that this statistic indeed provides key 
information, so it is included here.
5.  The  debt- to- GDP  ratio,  bt/  yt.
For the EMU, the data has been obtained from the ECB, and is in use 
for the area-  wide model. For the United States, the data has been obtained 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. For debt, I have used the series 
GFDEBTN; that is, debt on the federal level.
I have used quarterly data from 1985 to 2005, striking a compromise 
between getting a reasonably long time span for data and relying on a rea-
sonably stable monetary policy environment. While EMU only exists since 
3. It also appeared to be initially sensible for the invertibility issue discussed in the next sec-
tion, when doing an exploration of the model properties with freely chosen parameters. That 
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1999, one might argue that the Bundesbank has eﬀectively played the role 
of a European central bank in the time before.
I am comparing the model in its log-  linearized version—that is, in terms 
of log- deviations from the steady state—to the data. I therefore take logs of 
all variables, and removed the means. The resulting ﬁ  ve time series used in 
estimation can therefore be seen in ﬁ  gure 9.4. In particular, I have linearly 
Fig. 9.4    Data used for estimation504    Harald Uhlig
detrended labor productivity. If there is a constant time trend in  t, it is fairly 
straightforward to correct all equations for it: essentially, this amounts to 
a slight correction in the discount rate. If the time trend is stochastic, the 
correction would imply a diﬀerent set of equations, comparing everything 
to the current level of productivity. Since I log-  linearized the model around 
a steady state with constant productivity, the linear detrending method is 
therefore more compatible with the theory.
The linearized model has been estimated using Dynare. In so doing, I 
have ﬁ  xed a number of parameters, and estimated others. A list is given in 
tables 9.1 and 9.2.
For the parameters ﬁ  xed a priori, I have set n    1, backing out the prefer-
ence parameter A, rather than vice versa. In order to capture the diﬀerent 
importance of banking in Europe versus the United States, I have ﬁ  xed ξ 
  0.5 for Europe, and ξ   0.1 for the United States. A good calibration for 
these numbers would be sensible: the results here instead should be taken 
as indicative for what would happen for reasonable, although perhaps not 
suﬃciently carefully calibrated, values for these parameters. The factor 
ﬁ  ve was chosen to roughly reﬂ  ect the approximately ﬁ  vefold ﬁ  nancing of 
ﬁ  rms through banks (rather than capital market instruments and stocks) in 
Europe compared to the United States. I have used 1 for the inverse Frisch 
elasticity   of labor supply. All the other parameters are fairly standard.
For the estimated parameters, I have chosen rather uninformative priors. 
For parameters that should sensibly be in the unit interval, I used a uniform 
distribution, or, equivalently, a beta distribution with mean 0.5 and a stan-
dard deviation of 1/ 
12    0.29. For parameters that ought to be positive, I 
have used an inverted gamma distribution with inﬁ  nite variance. I have used 
Table 9.1  List of parameters ﬁ  xed a priori
Parameter   U.S.   EMU, if diﬀerent   Interpretation
  1 Productivity
  0.99 Discount factor
  0.36 Capital share
  0.02 Depreciation rate
  1 Inverse Frisch elasticity
  0.8   markup Fixed cost
  0.5 Markup
ϖ 2 Cost of adjustment of capital
ϒ 1.1 Wage markup
ξ 0.1 0.5 Bank ﬁ  nancing share
g/y 0.15 0.2 Gov. spending to GDP
b/y 0.62 Debt- to- GDP  ratio
  1.033 Inﬂ  ation
  V   0.2       Proﬁ  t or value added taxMonetary Policy in Europe versus the United States    5 0 5
a normal distribution centered at zero and a standard deviation of 1 for ζg, 
which is certainly wide.
9.4      A, B, C, and D’s of VARs
When estimating a model with just a subset of variables, the issue of 
invertibility may be of concern. Invertibility may matter even more for recov-
ering the sequence of shocks explaining the observations. I use the ABCD 
framework of Fernandez- Villaverde, Rubio- Ramirez, and Sargent (2007) to 
investigate the issue: the name of their paper has inspired the choice of the 
title for this subsection.
Let xt be the list of log- deviations from steady state for all variables in the 
economy, including the exogenous disturbances ui,t, and so forth. Let yt be 
a list of observable variables, and let εt be the vector of i.i.d. shocks driving 
the system. Solving the linearized model with, for example, the methods 
exposited in Uhlig (1999), provides a recursive law of motion
(34)  xt   Axt 1   Bεt
(35)  yt   Cxt 1   Dεt.
Table 9.2  List of estimated parameters
Parameter   Distribution   Mean   Standard deviation   Interpretation
  beta 0.5 0.29 Cash- in- advance  share
  beta 0.5 0.29 Permanent liquidity
  beta 0.5 0.29 Calvo prob. of stickiness
  beta 0.5 0.29 Habit share
  beta 0.5 0.29 Wage sluggishness
 w beta 0.5 0.29 Autocorr. wage disturb.
  ,L beta 0.5 0.29 Autoregr. techn.
  ,u beta 0.5 0.29 Autocorr. techn. disturb.
 x beta 0.5 0.29 Autocorr. inv disturb.
 i,L beta 0.5 0.29 Autoregr. int. rate
 i,u beta 0.5 0.29 Autocorr. int. rate disturb.
   beta 0.5 0.29 Autocorr. tax disturb.
ζ  inv.gamma 0.5   Tax rule
ζg normal –0.2 1 Spending rule
ζ  inv.gamma 1.5   Taylor rule: on inﬂ  ation
ζx inv.gamma 0.5   Taylor rule: on markup
stderr(ε ) inv.gamma 0.2   Std. err techn.
stderr(εi) inv.gamma 0.2   Std. err int. rate
stderr(ε ) inv.gamma 0.2   Std. err tax rate
stderr(εx) inv.gamma 0.2   Std. err inv. shock
stderr(εw)   inv.gamma   0.2       Std. err wage shock
Note: std. err.   standard error.506    Harald Uhlig
Assume that D is square and invertible, and that the eigenvalues of (A –   
BD– 1C) are strictly less than one in modulus. Fernandez-  Villaverde, Rubio- 
Ramirez, and Sargent (2007) show that




∑(A   BD 1C) jyt j 1   Dεt
is an (inﬁ  nite-  order) vector autoregression for yt, and that Dεt are the one- 
step ahead forecasts for yt.
Let




∑(A   BD 1C) 1yt j 1   Dεt   ϑk,t,
be a ﬁ  nite-  order approximation to the inﬁ  nite-  order VAR in (36), deﬁ  ning 
the approximation error ϑk,t. Given a recursive law of motion as in (34) and 
(35), and assuming D to be square and invertible, it is always possible to 
calculate the ﬁ  nite-  order approximation (37). In practice, one would drop 
ϑk,t from this equation, hoping that it is small. Equation (37) then provides 
for a convenient procedure to recover the residuals εt driving the data.
But ϑk,t may not be small, either, because the eigenvalues of (A –   BD– 1C) 
are not strictly less than one in modulus, or because they are only just below 
one, with the coeﬃcients in (36) only gradually dying out with increasing lag 
length. The latter is the problem emphasized by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrat-
tan (2005).
It may thus be useful to examine how fast the coeﬃcients in (37) die out at 
a speciﬁ  c parameterization of the model. Grouping the coeﬃcients together 
according to lag length, I do this in ﬁ  gure 9.5 for the coeﬃcient speciﬁ  cations 
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following for the United States and EMU. Note that the VAR coeﬃcients 
die out quite fast.
9.5    Results
9.5.1    Estimates
The results of the estimation are provided in table 9.3. The results are 
taken directly from Dynare, using standard settings. While some of the conﬁ  -
dence intervals are perhaps too tight—most likely pointing to yet insuﬃcient 
sampling—the estimates all appear to be reasonable.
Taking these estimates at face value, there are some interesting diﬀerences 
as well as similarities in the comparison of the United States to EMU. Sur-
prisingly, according to these estimates, wages actually appear to be more 
ﬂ  exible and less sluggish in the EMU rather than the United States, with 
    0.18 and  w   0.88 there, as opposed to     0.06 and  w   0.686 in the 
EMU. Less surprisingly, prices appear to be more sticky in EMU with     
0.778 than the United States, with     0.668. Productivity (or, for the United 
Table 9.3  Estimation results
U.S. EMU
Parameter   Mean   Conf. interval   Mean   Conf. interval
  0.57 [0.23, 0.90] 0.38 [0.16, 0.60]
  0.27 [0.00, 0.68] 0.981 [0.974, 0.995]
  0.668 [0.667, 0.676] 0.778 [0.769, 0.793]
  0.64 [0.64, 0.65] 0.35 [0.30, 0.42]
  0.18 [0.17, 0.18] 0.061 [0.055, 0.078]
 w 0.88 [0.88, 0.89] 0.686 [0.682, 0.685]
  ,L 0.00 [0.00, 0.00] 0.979 [0.978, 0.980]
  ,u 0.93 [0.93, 0.96] 0.266 [0.248, 0.262]
 x 1 [1, 1] 0.962 [0.958, 0.964]
 i,L 0.73 [0.73, 0.74] 0.289 [0.285, 0.290]
 i,u 0.24 [0.22, 0.24] 0.496 [0.495, 0.498]
   0.99 [0.99, 0.99] 0.985 [0.982, 0.984]
ζ  0.18 [0.18, 0.18] 0.356 [0.352, 0.355]
ζg –0.058 [–0.058, –0.058] 0.079 [0.078, 0.079]
ζ  1.07 [1.07, 1.07] 1.192 [1.192, 1.193]
ζx 0.35 [0.35, 0.35] 0.211 [0.210, 0.211]
std. err.(ε ) 0.26 [0.24, 0.26] 0.30 [0.29, 0.33]
std. err.(εi) 2.38 [2.38, 2.55] 1.08 [1.05, 1.24]
std. err.(ε ) 1.56 [1.58, 1.64] 0.52 [0.49, 0.58]
std. err.(εx) 2.15 [2.07, 2.25] 1.95 [1.81, 2.16]
std. err.(εw)   0.84   [0.80, 0.87]   0.49   [0.45, 0.56]
Note: std. err.   standard error.508    Harald Uhlig
States, the productivity disturbance), tax disturbances, and investment- 
speciﬁ  c disturbances are all essentially random walks.
The fraction   of cash required for consumption transactions is about 
one- third in EMU and about one- half in the United States. Monetary injec-
tions seem to be temporary in the United States,     0.27, but permanent in 
Europe,     0.981. Interest rates show a persistence of  i,L   0.289: one- third 
in EMU and about three- quarters in the United States: if anything, interest 
rate choices appear to be more sluggish in the United States. The Taylor 
rule coeﬃcients are about 1.2 on inﬂ  ation and 0.2 on markup in the EMU, 
which is reasonable. They are slightly lower for inﬂ  ation and slightly higher 
on markup for the United States.
The feedback coeﬃcients for ﬁ  scal policy diﬀer in an interesting way. In 
response to a higher debt burden, the United States moderately raises taxes, 
ζ    0.18, and cuts spending, ζg   –  0.058, while the Europeans actually 
increase spending, ζg   0.079, and ﬁ  nance it by raising taxes even more, ζ  
  0.356.
Monetary policy shocks, tax shocks, and wage shocks show considerably 
larger standard deviations in the United States than in EMU.
As a postscriptum, the estimation results and therefore the conclusions 
based on them should be viewed with a considerable degree of caution. Note 
that the parameters are estimated rather indirectly: identiﬁ  cation is achieved 
through their impact on the dynamics of the whole system, rather than some 
more direct consequence. It is likely that misspeciﬁ  cation of the model can 
easily thwart the attempt to draw reasonable inference here: investigating 
that issue is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Even with the route taken here, it turns out that the model and its estima-
tion appear to be quite sensitive, in particular with respect to the parameters 
ξ, as well as the ﬁ  scal policy parameters g /  y , ζ , ζg. For example, it is fairly 
easy to ﬁ  nd parameter combinations where Dynare delivers nonsensical 
results or complains about violations of the Blanchard-  Kahn condition for 
the prior, while it is still possible to calculate solutions with my “toolkit”: 
as an example, take ξ   1, g /  y    0.35, ζ    1, ζg   0, and otherwise taking 
prior means for all other variables. For some other parameter settings, one 
obtains warnings about badly scaled matrices and diﬃculties in starting 
the Markov chain. It is also not unusual that the posterior maximization 
procedure encounters a cliﬀ shortly before it declare the maximum to be 
reached. This is true in particular for the estimation of the U.S. model, 
possibly explaining the unplausibly tight conﬁ  dence bands for several 
parameters. The estimation results can also depend quite substantially on 
g /  y  and ξ, which have been ﬁ  xed a priori. In sum, either the model or the 
estimation procedure is ill- behaved in certain aspects. Exploring these sensi-
tivities and the reasons further would be interesting, but beyond the scope of 
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9.5.2    Impulse  Responses
To understand the properties of the model, I have calculated the impulse 
responses to shocks 1 percent in size, with the estimated parameters set at 
the posterior means rounded to two digits. Figure 9.6 shows the impulse 
response of the nominal interest rate. Figure 9.7 shows the response of out-
Fig. 9.6    Impulse responses of interest rates510    Harald Uhlig
put and ﬁ  gure 9.8 shows the response of inﬂ  ation. A technical appendix also 
shows the impulse responses of the remaining variables used for estimating 
the model; that is, labor productivity, the consumption- to- output ratio, and 
the  debt- to- output  ratio.
In these ﬁ  gures, I have also considered two “intermediate” parameter-
izations to judge the contribution of two features in particular: the higher 
(assumed) requirement for bank lending in the EMU parameterization, and 
the parameterization of the labor market with   and  w. Starting from the 
U.S. parameterization, I have ﬁ  rst only changed the parameter ξ from 0.2 
Fig. 9.7    Impulse responses of interest ratesMonetary Policy in Europe versus the United States    5 1 1
to 1. Next I also have changed the parameters for the labor market to the 
EMU estimates.
It turns out that the banking requirement ξ matters only for a few key 
responses and variables. For example, the response of nominal interest rates 
as well as inﬂ  ation to investment disturbances moves sizably, when chang-
ing ξ. The change in labor market parameters matters in particular in the 
response of inﬂ  ation to monetary policy shocks—which becomes less pro-
nounced in the United States, if using EMU labor market parameters—as 
well as the reaction to wage disturbances of all three variables.
Note also that the diﬀerence in the monetary policy reaction function in 
Fig. 9.8    Impulse responses of interest rates512    Harald Uhlig
EMU compared to the United States shows, if anything, a more pronounced 
reaction to shocks one standard deviation in size, which then is counterbal-
anced by the fact that these shocks appear to be smaller. The shape and thus 
the speed of the reaction looks similar across both regions. That is, by and 
large, the EMU monetary policy reaction function looks like the U.S. mon-
etary policy reaction function, scaled up a bit, perhaps by a factor of two. 
This is inconsistent with the view that monetary policy in EMU is sklerotic 
or that it is indecisive decision-  making by a committee of monetary policy 
makers in Europe.
9.5.3    Answering  the  Question
Equipped with these tools, I can ﬁ  nally provide an answer to the question 
with which this chapter started out. The answer is provided4 graphically in 
ﬁ  gure 9.9. Note that all ﬁ  gures there have been drawn on the same scale for 
comparison. This ﬁ  gure decomposes the surprise movements in the United 
States and the EMU into the ﬁ  ve shocks, and adds up their contributions to 
the cumulative forecast error, compared to the no- shock prediction in 1998. 
That is, the sequence of shocks, shown in ﬁ  gure 9.10, give rise to impulse 
responses of the short-  term interest rate or central bank interest rate: these 
impulse responses are cumulated at each point in time, for all present and 
past shocks (back to 1998) shown.
It turns out that three main sources of the movements come from tech-
nology shocks, from monetary policy shocks, and ﬁ  nally, from wage shocks. 
Interestingly, the monetary policy shocks provide a fairly similar pattern 
for both Europe and the United States. The top right-  hand plot in ﬁ  gure 
9.9 shows that monetary policy was tighter in both the United States and 
EMU in 2000, but considerably looser in 2004, than can be explained by all 
other variables and historical experience. If one views these shocks as policy 
mistakes, one would conclude that pretty much the same mistakes have been 
made in both regions, and that, if anything, the Fed seemed to follow the 
ECB rather than the other way around.
Surprise movements in productivity provide for a key diﬀerence between 
the United States and EMU. Note that movements in labor productivity in 
the new millenium were sharply diﬀerent in the United States and in EMU, 
as evidenced by the left ﬁ  gure in the second row of ﬁ  gure 9.4. Figure 9.6 
shows that monetary policy reacts to surprise rises in productivity and thus 
the surprise fall in marginal costs by lowering interest rates, see the top left 
panel. The central bank can aﬀord to do so, since inﬂ  ation is falling anyhow, 
as a result, see the top left panel in ﬁ  gure 9.8. Together, it then may no longer 
surprise that the productivity movements in this millenium led to a consid-
4. It would be even better to provide standard errors in these graphs, based on the posterior 
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erable downward drift of interest rates in the United States, but upward 
pressure in the EMU (see the top left panel in ﬁ  gure 9.9).
The main additional diﬀerence then arises due to surprise wage move-
ments. In the United States, they have contributed to raising interest rates 
before 2000 and after 2004, with the opposite movements in the EMU (see 
the bottom panel in ﬁ  gure 9.9).
While the reaction function of U.S. and EMU monetary policy to both 
Fig. 9.9    Contribution of each shock to the cumulative forecast error, compared to 
the no-  shock prediction starting in 1996514    Harald Uhlig
wage shocks and productivity shocks diﬀer quantitatively (see ﬁ  gure 9.6), 
they do not diﬀer qualitatively. The diﬀerences in the interest rate move-
ments in ﬁ  gure 9.9 arises due to diﬀerent shocks, actually almost moving in 
oppositive direction for both variables.
In sum, it appears that the diﬀerence between the two monetary policies 
seen in ﬁ  gure 9.1 is due to both surprises in productivity as well as surprises 
in wage demands, moving interest rates in opposite directions in Europe and 
the United States, but not due to a more sluggish response in Europe to the 
same shocks or to diﬀerent monetary policy surprises.
Fig. 9.10    Sequence of shocksMonetary Policy in Europe versus the United States    5 1 5
9.6    Discussion  and  Conclusion
The conclusion from this quantitative exercise appears to be that the 
diﬀerence between the two monetary policies seen in ﬁ  gure 9.1 is due to 
both surprises in productivity as well as surprises in wage demands, moving 
interest rates in opposite directions in Europe and the United States, but not 
due to a more sluggish response in Europe to the same shocks or to diﬀerent 
monetary policy surprises. If anything, it appears that monetary policy in 
EMU reacts more strongly to shocks, when they appear.
But a number of words of caution are in order. First, these conclusions 
hinge on a particular choice of shocks propagating in the economy. There 
is a trade-  oﬀ between missing an important disturbance as explanation 
versus adding spurious shocks and thus risking to misinterpret important 
economic dynamics as movements in these spurious disturbances instead.
Second, the conclusions hinge on the particular model chosen. Is there 
any sense that they are correct across a wide range of models or approaches? 
The model may be faulty in a number of crucial features, or improve on these 
features compared to other models. How are we to judge this? Acknowledg-
ing misspeciﬁ  cation of the theory and seeking robust approaches to answer 
the key question may be a way to proceed further (see, e.g., Hansen and 
Sargent 2001).
Third, while the chapter has provided an accounting method for explain-
ing the diﬀerent interest paths in the United States and the EMU, it has not 
asked whether this diﬀerence is, in fact, optimal or what the optimal reaction 
function should have been. That is, it may be the case that U.S. monetary 
policy has behaved badly and EMU monetary policy has done the right 
thing, or the other way around. The previous analysis has not addressed this 
issue all. The tools for pursuing this question are provided in, for example, 
Schmitt- Grohe and Uribe (2004, 2005) or Levin et al. (2006). One could even 
combine the perspective of optimality with the acknowledgment of mis-
speciﬁ  cation and a desire for robustness (see, e.g., Levin and Williams 2003).
At the end of the day, there appears to be little else than delivering quan-
titative answers, based on thoughtfully chosen assumptions. This chapter 
hopes to make a contribution to that end. Along its novel features it has 
provided a possibility for considering traditional lending channels of mon-
etary policy alongside the sticky-  price perspective pursued by the more 
recent new-  Keynesian literature. To that end, a hybrid new-  Keynesian cash 
in advance model has been provided, estimated, and used to quantitatively 
answer the question at hand.
Some progress has been made. But much more needs to be done.516    Harald Uhlig
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Final Good Firms
Maximizing proﬁ  ts




subject to the production function (6) results in the demand function
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Intermediate Good Firms
Cost minimization leads to the nominal marginal costs of producing an 
extra unit of output,




and therefore to the real marginal costs




excluding the costs of borrowing from bank.
Cost minimization also implies that
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Therefore, the capital-  labor ratio kt,j/  nt, j is the same across all ﬁ  rms, and 
equal to the aggregate ratio kt– 1/  nt. Aggregating (55) and (56) across all ﬁ  rms 
yields518    Harald Uhlig
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Note that (57) follows from (57) with (54) or vice- versa. I will therefore drop 
(57) when collecting all equations following. Alternatively, observe that (57) 
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and where (St/  P t)(1  )/    can be thought of as a correction of the Solow resid-
ual due to sticky prices. This correction is known to disappear in a ﬁ  rst-  order 
log-  linear approximation (see also [123]), but it may be relevant in higher- 
order approximations.
When a ﬁ  rm can reoptimize its price Pt∗   P t,j, it seeks to maximize the 
objective (11), taking into account the dependence of demand on its cho-
sen price in future dates, if prices cannot be reoptimized, and taking into 
account the costs of borrowing from banks,
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which essentially says that P∗ is a markup of   over nominal marginal costs 
inclusive of the costs of borrowing,
P t k(1   ξit k)mct k,
appropriately discounted.
Aggregating (9) across all ﬁ  rms delivers




Note that the required loan quantity per intermediate good ﬁ  rms is
(65)  Lt,j   ξMCt(yt,j    ).
Aggregating, and equalizing to available funds yields in real terms
(66) 
dt 1  
 t
    t   ξmct tk 
t 1nt
1  ,
which I shall use instead of (33).
Parameters
The fundamental parameters are
A,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,   ,   ,L,   ,u,  x, ϖ,
and the variance of the technology shock and investment-  speciﬁ  c shock. 
The parameters for prices, wages, and credit markets are
ϒ,  ,  , ξ,  w,  ,
and the variance of the wage shock. The policy parameters are
g , b ,   ,  ,  V,
as well as the feedback coeﬃcients
ζ , ζg, ζ , ζx,  i,L,  i,u,   ,  g,
and variances of the policy shocks.
Collecting the Equations
The equations characterizing the equilibrium are (HH: “household”; 
“FG”: ﬁ  nal good ﬁ  rms; “IG”: intermediate good ﬁ  rms; “CB”: central bank; 
“GOV”: government; “MC”: labor market and market clearing):
(67) HH:  0      ct   
ht 1  
 t
(68) HH:  0     ht   dt   qtbt   (1    )ct   xt  (1    t)wtnt   rtkt 1 
  
1   it  
 t
dt 1   (1    V)vt   
bt 1  
 t520    Harald Uhlig
(69) HH:  0     kt   1       ϕ
xt  
kt 1kt 1
(70) HH:  0      t   (1    ) t   
1
  
ct    ct 1
     Et
1
  
ct 1    ct
(71) HH:  0      t    Et
t 1  
 t 1
(72) HH:  0      t    Et t 1
1   it 1  
 t 1 
(73) HH:  0      tqt    Et
 t 1  
 t 1
(74) HH:  0      t   (1   ux,t)ϕ (1   ux,t)
xt  
kt 1ςt
(75) HH:  0     ςt    Et[ t 1r t 1]
  Etςt 11       ϕ(1   ux,t 1)
xt 1  
kt 
  Etςt 1(1   ux,t 1)ϕ (1   ux,t 1)
xt 1  
kt 
xt 1  
kt 
(76) HH:  0      t(1    t)wt,f   (1    )Ant
 
(77) FG:  0     yt(P∗
t k)   




(1  )/   
yt
(78) FG:  0     P t   ((1    )(Pt∗) 1/       (  P t 1) 1/   )  
(79) IG:  0     St   ((1    )(Pt∗) (1  )/    
   (  St 1) (1  )/   )  / (1  )
(80) IG:  0     yt   
St  
P t
(1  )/   
( tk 
t 1nt
1      )




(82) IG:  0     r tkt 1    mct tk 
t 1nt
1  
(83) IG:  0     Pt∗Et
 k=0
 
∑(  )k  t kP t  
 tP t k
  
kyt k(Pt∗)
 (1    )Et
 k=0
 
∑(  )k  t kP t  
 tP t k
yt k(Pt∗)P t k(1   ξit k)mct k
(84) IG:  0    vt   yt   (1   ξit)mct tk 
t 1nt
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(85) CB:  0     it   i     i,Lit 1
 (1    i,L)ζ 
 t  
  
   1   ζx
mct  
m c 
   1   ui,t
(86) CB:  0     mt   
mt 1  
 t
     t
(87) GOV:  0     qtbt   
bt 1  
 t
   gt    twtnt    Vvt   (    it) t
(88) GOV:  0      t        ζ 
bt 1   b 
 
y 
   1   u ,t
(89) GOV:  0     
gt  
y 
   ζg
bt 1   b 
 
b 
   1   ug,t
(90) MC:  0     wt   ((1    )wt 1    ϒwt,f)(1   uw,t)
(91) MC:  0     mt   dt   ht
(92) MC:  0     yt   gt   ct   xt
(93) MC:  0     
dt 1  
 t
    t   ξmct tk 
t 1nt
1  
(94) MC:  0      t   
P t  
P t 1
together with the speciﬁ  cation for the exogenous processes
(95) techn.:    ˆt     ,L  ˆt 1   ε ,t
(96) mon.pol:  ui,t    i,uui,t 1   εi,t
(97) taxes:  u ,t     u ,t 1   ε ,t
(98) gov.spend.:  ug,t    gug,t 1   εg,t
(99) investment:  ux,t    xux,t 1   εx,t
(100) wages:  uw,t    wuw,t 1   εw,t.
The previous equations determine the quantities





dt, ht, mt,  t,522    Harald Uhlig
multipliers
t,  t, ςt,
prices and tax rate
it, P t, Pt∗, qt, St, wt, wt,f,  t,  t,
as well as the exogenous processes
 t, ui,t, ur,t, ug,t, ux,t, uw,t.
Note that these are 34 equations for 33 variables. One may drop either the 
household budget constraint, the government budget constraint, or one of 
the market-  clearing conditions, due to Walras’ law.
Steady State
Household
To calculate the steady state, and since my focus is not on a steady-  state 
comparison across various parameters, I assume a value for n  and instead 
back out the compatible preference parameter A. The capital accumulation 
equation (69) implies
(101)  x     k .
The ﬁ  rst-  order conditions (71) and (74) of the households imply
(102)      
    
 
  
(103)  ς      .
For the rental rate of capital, the ﬁ  rst-  order condition (75) implies




   1    .
The ﬁ  rst-  order conditions (72) and (73) imply




   




We shall assume that the parameters imply v    0. Equations (78), (79), 
and (94) deliver
P t∗   S t   P  t     P  t 1.
With equation (77),Monetary Policy in Europe versus the United States    5 2 3
y(P ∗
t k)   y .
The markup equation (83) for the intermediate good implies
(106) m c    
1
  
(1    )(1   ξı )
.
This and equation (82) imply




(107)  k    
 m c     
r  
1/  (1  )
n .
From this and (81) or, equivalently, (57), obtain





   (1    )  / (1  )(m c   )1/  (1  )r 
  / (1  ).
With this as well as equations (80, 92, 70, 90, 84)
(109)  y      k 
 n 
1      
(110)  c    y    g     k 
(111)        
    
 
   1    
 1 1     
 





(112)  w f   
w   
ϒ
(113)  v    y    (1   ξı )m c   k 
 n 
1  
(114)    
 
 
1    
  k 
 n 
1      
(115)    y    
1
 
1    
(y     ),
which now allows to solve for the steady-  state values of the Lagrange mul-
tipliers in (102).
Monetary Quantities
Cash demand is given by (67) or
h       c .
To calculate the other monetary quantities, combine the three steady-  state 
relationships of (86, 91, 93),524    Harald Uhlig




m    d    h 




     ,
to obtain
(116)  m    
   
  




(117)       
     1
 
   
m 
(118)  d    m    h .
Note that the fraction appearing in the equation for m  equals 1, if either 
     1 or     1. For technical reasons, one must set     0. Note that      1 
implies      0.
Remaining Equations
The steady-  state government budget constraint (88)
(119)    w n    
1    
 
  
b    g     Vv    (    ı )  ,
can be solved for the steady- state level of taxes   . With this and (76), calculate 
the preference parameter A per
(120) A    
  (1     )
 
1    
n 
  w f.
Note ﬁ  nally that (95) to (98) deliver
z    a    f      f  g   0.
Log- Linearization
Let hat on variables denote the logarithmic deviation from steady-  state 
values; for example, c ˆt   log(ct)– log(c ). For nominal quantities, in particu-
lar prices, I use, likewise, P ˆ
t   log(P t)– log(P  t), where I note that P  t     
kP  0, 
starting from some initial level P  0. I make the following exceptions for the 
notation, so as to allow zero values in steady state or to obtain meaningful 
quantities:
 r t   r    r ˆt
 i t   i    iˆ
tMonetary Policy in Europe versus the United States    5 2 5
   t          ˆt
 g t   g    g ˆty 
 b t   b    b ˆ
ty 
   t        m   ˆ
t.
Hence, r ˆt,   ˆt, and iˆ
t are in percent, g ˆt and b ˆ
t are in percent of steady-  state 
output, and   ˆ
t is in percent of the steady-  state money supply. Most equa-
tions can be log- linearized in a straightforward manner, but some equations 
require a bit more thought. They are explained now.
Pricing Decisions
The following derivation is standard in the literature on new-  Keynesian 
models and is replicated here for completeness.
Equations (78) and (79) log-  linearize to
(121)  P ˆ
t   (1    )P ˆ
t∗    P ˆ
t 1
S ˆ
t   (1    )P ˆ
t∗    S ˆ
t 1
and thus
(122)  S ˆ
t   P ˆ
t.
This substantiates the claim that the correction to the Solow residual in (59) 
vanishes in a ﬁ  rst-  order approximation.
The ﬁ  rst- order condition (83) of the intermediate good ﬁ  rms log-  linearizes 
to
(123) P ˆ
t∗   (1     )Et
 k=0
 
∑ (  )k
ξ
 
1   ξı 
ı ˆ t k   mc  t k   P ˆ
t k.
A rather “pedestrian” but fail-  safe way to see this is to indeed replace all 
variables, say xt k, with their log-  linearized counterpart x(1   x ˆt k), drop 
all products of hat-  variables as “higher order” (or better, do not write them 
down—there are many). Simplify the constants, employing equation (106). 
A slightly more sophisticated approach is to immediately log- linearize prod-
ucts, say xtytzt to xyz(1   x ˆt   y ˆt   z ˆt).
The previous equation can be rewritten as
(124)  P ˆ
t∗   (1     )
ξ
 
1   ξı 
ı ˆ t   mc  t   P ˆ
t     Et[P ˆ∗
t 1].
From equation (122), substitute P ˆ
t∗ and P ˆ∗
t 1 per
P ˆ
t∗   
1
 
1    
(P ˆ
t    P ˆ
t 1).
Combine terms to obtain the new-  Keynesian Phillips curve526    Harald Uhlig
(125)    ˆt    Et[  ˆt 1]   κ
ξ
 
1   ξı 
ı ˆ t   mc  t,
where
(126)  κ   




One may view the driving term
ξ
 
1   ξı 
ı ˆ t   mc  t
either as reﬂ  ecting marginal costs inclusive of the costs of borrowing or as 
a correction to net marginal cost by an interest rate cost channel, as empha-
sized by Christiano et al. (2003).
Collecting Log-  Linearized Equations Without Expectations
We shall drop the budget constraint of the household—appealing to Wal-
ras’ law—as well as equations from pricing decisions and demand, which 
are no longer needed. All remaining equations without expectations are, in 
log- linearized  form:
(127) HH:  0     c ˆt   h ˆ
t 1     ˆt
(128) HH:  0     k ˆ
t    x ˆt   (1    )k ˆ
t 1    ux,t






(x ˆt   k ˆ




(130) HH:  0       ˆ
t   
  ˆt  
1     
   w ˆt,f    n ˆt
(131) IG:  0     
y   
y     
y ˆt     ˆt    k ˆ
t 1   (1    )n ˆt
(132) IG:  0     mc  t    
r ˆt  
r 
   (1    )w ˆt     ˆt
(133) IG:  0     
r ˆt  
r 
   mc  t    t   (1    )(n ˆt   k ˆ
t 1)
(134) IG:  0    
v   
y    v 
v ˆt   
y   
y    v 
y ˆt   
ξ
 
1   ξi 
iˆ
t
 mc  t     ˆt    k ˆ
t 1   (1    )nt
(135) CB:  0     iˆ
t    i,Liˆ
t 1   (1    i,L)(ζ   ˆt   ζxmc  t   ui,t).Monetary Policy in Europe versus the United States    5 2 7




(m ˆ t 1     ˆt)      ˆ
t
(137) GOV:  0     q (b q ˆt   y b ˆ





t 1   b   ˆt)   y g ˆt
 w n   ˆt     w n (w ˆt   n ˆt)    Vv v ˆt   (    ı )m   ˆ
t     ı ˆ t
(138) GOV:  0       ˆt   ζ b ˆ
t 1   u ,t
(139) GOV:  0     g ˆt   ζgb ˆ
t 1   ug,t
(140) MC:  0     w ˆt   (1    )w ˆt 1    w ˆt,f   uw,t
(141) MC:  0     m m ˆt   d dˆ
t   h h ˆ
t
(142) MC:  0     y y ˆt   y g ˆt   c c ˆt   x x ˆt
(143) MC:  0    
d 
 
d        
(d ˆ
t 1     ˆt)   
  m   
d        
  ˆ
t
  mc  t     ˆt    k ˆ
t 1   (1    )n ˆt
together with the speciﬁ  cation for the exogenous processes
(144) techn.:    ˆt     ,L  ˆt 1   u ,t
(145)   u ,t     ,uu ,t 1   ε ,t
(146) mon.pol:  ui,t    i,uui,t 1   εi,t
(147) taxes:  u ,t     u ,t 1   ε ,t
(148) gov.spend.:  ug,t    gug,t 1   εg,t
(149) investment:  ux,t    xux,t 1   εx,t
(150) wages:  uw,t    wuw,t 1   εw,t.
Collecting Log-  Linearized Equations with Expectations
All equations with expectations in log-  linearized form are:
(151) HH:  0     
(1     )(1    )
  
 (   )   1     
    
 
 ˆt   (1    )  ˆ
t
  c ˆt 1   (1     2)c ˆt     Et[c ˆt 1]
(152) HH:  0       ˆ
t   Et[ ˆt 1     ˆt 1]
(153) HH:  0       ˆ
t   Et[  ˆ
t 1   
iˆ
t 1  
1   i 
     ˆt 1]
(154) HH:  0       ˆ
t   q ˆt   Et[  ˆ
t 1     ˆt 1]528    Harald Uhlig
(155) HH:  0     ς ˆt    Et[r   ˆ
t 1   r ˆt 1]




(x ˆt 1   k ˆ
t   ux,t 1)]
(156)  FG, IG: 0      ˆt    Et[  ˆt 1]   κ
ξ
 
1   ξi 
iˆ
t   mc  t.
These equations and the equations without expectations determine the evo-
lution of the log-  deviations for the quantities
b ˆ
t, c ˆt, g ˆt, n ˆt, v ˆt, y ˆt, mc  t, k ˆ




t, m ˆ t,   ˆ
t,
multipliers
 ˆt,   ˆ
t, ς ˆt,
prices and tax rate
ı ˆ t, q ˆt, w ˆt, w ˆt,f,   ˆt,   ˆt.
Note that there are twenty-  three equations for twenty-  three variables, plus 
the equations for the exogenous processes.
Note that qt is the inverse of the one-  period risk free return Rt, f from 
period t to t   1. Hence
R ˆ
t,f    q ˆt.
Note that generally iˆ
t   R ˆ
t– 1,f, since iˆ
t can react to shocks within period t.
Deﬁ  ne




(x ˆt   k ˆ








(x ˆt 1   k ˆ
t 2)   
1
 




One may interpret this as the log-  deviation of the return to capital, taking 
into account the cost of adjustment and the additional discounting due 
to the extra period of being able to spend the rental rate on consumption. 
With this deﬁ  nition and the help of equation (130), one can rewrite (155) as
(158)   0       ˆ
t    (  ˆ
t    ˆt)  Et[ t 1     (1    )( ˆt 1     ˆ
t 1)    r ˆ∗
t 1],
which may be a more intuitive or familiar expression.
Figures
Shown here are the impulse responses of the three variables used for esti-
mating the model, not shown in the body of the chapter.Fig. 9A.1    Impulse response of the log consumption-  output ratio to six shocks, each 
providing a comparison of three model speciﬁ  cations for the United States and one 
speciﬁ  cation for the EMUFig. 9A.2    Impulse response of the debt-  output ratio to six shocks, each providing a 
comparison of three model speciﬁ  cations for the United States and one speciﬁ  cation 
for the EMUFig. 9A.3    Impulse response of the log output-  labor ratio (i.e., the log labor produc-
tivity) to six shocks, each providing a comparison of three model speciﬁ  cations for 
the United States and one speciﬁ  cation for the EMU532    Harald Uhlig
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Comment  Andrew Levin
Over the past decade or so, researchers at academic institutions and cen-
tral banks have been active in specifying and estimating dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) models that can be used for the analysis of 
monetary policy.1 While the ﬁ  rst generation models were relatively small 
and stylized, more recent models typically embed a much more elaborate 
dynamic structure aimed at capturing key aspects of the aggregate data.2 
Indeed, a number of central banks are now employing DSGE models in the 
forecasting process and in formulating and communicating policy strategies. 
Andrew Levin is associate director of the Division of Monetary Aﬀairs at the Federal 
Reserve Board.
The views expressed in this comment are solely those of the author, and should not be inter-
preted as representing the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System nor 
of anyone else associated with the Federal Reserve System.
1. Pioneering early studies include King and Wolman (1996, 1999); Goodfriend and King 
(1997); Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999); Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999); and McCal-
lum and Nelson (1999).
2. See Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005); Smets and Wouters (2003); Levin et al. 
(2006); and Schmitt-  Gröhe and Uribe (2006).